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The names of all parties to the proceedings in the lower court are set forth in the 
caption of the case on appeal. 
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Vlll 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue #1: Whether on defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff 
presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of negligence against the 
Mateuses for their failure to control and/or restrain their cat so as to prevent the cat's 
attack on Mrs. Jackson. 
Standard of Review for Issue #1: The Supreme Court reviews the trial court's 
summary judgment ruling for correctness. Kessler v. Mortenson. 16 P.3d 1225, 1226 
(Utah 2000). The appellate court considers only whether the trial court correctly 
applied the law and correcdy concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed. 
Aurora Credit Servs.. Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev.. Inc.. 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 
1998). This is the standard of review applied because summary judgment is appropriate 
only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
UtahR. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Issue #2: Whether the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that no 
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genuine issue of material exists regarding whether the Mateuses had any duty to control 
or restrain their cat, or to prevent their cat's attack. 
Standard of Review for Issue #2: The issue of "whether a 'duty' exists is a 
question of law" which appellate courts review for correctness. Weber v. Springville 
City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986). Moreover, when deciding whether the trial 
court correctly found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, appellate courts 
review the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
losing party. See id Additionally, because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law, appellate courts give the trial court's legal conclusions no deference and review 
the decision for correctness. See White v. Gary L. Deseelhorst. NP Ski Corp., 879 
P.2dl371, 1374 (Utah 1994). 
Issue #3: Whether the trial court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that there 
were no disputed material facts regarding whether the Mateuses' cat's attack on Mrs. 
Jackson was unforeseeable. 
Standard of Review for Issue #3: See Standards of Review for Issue #2. 
Issue #4: Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that 
defendants did not violate Salt Lake County Ordinances, §§ 8.24.010, 8.04.210, and 
8.24.030. 
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Standard of Review for Issue #4: An appellate court grants a trial court's 
construction of statutes or ordinances no deference, but reviews the decision for 
correctness. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents. 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997). 
Moreover, whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law that 
an appellate court reviews de novo. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); 
see also State v. Waite. 803 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Utah 1990). 
Issue #5: Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the 
Mateuses' cat was lawfully on the Jackson's property when the attack occurred. 
Standard of Review for Issue #5: See Standard of Review for Issue No. #1. 
Issue #6: Whether the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that a cat is 
allowed one free bite before its owners may be held liable for injuries inflicted by the 
cat. 
Standard of Review for Issue #6; See Standard of Review for Issue No. #1. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 4-25-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-64 
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1 (1998) 
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.010 
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.030 
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Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.04.210 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
On January 15, 1996, the Mateuses' cat attacked Judith Campbell Jackson, who 
was severely injured by the unprovoked attack. Mrs. Jackson brought an action in the 
Third District Court against the Mateuses for negligence in failing to restrain and 
control their pet. Mrs. Jackson appeals from the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for the Mateuses on all of Mrs. Jackson's claims. 
Statement of Facts 
This case arises out of an unprovoked attack by the Mateuses' cat on Mrs. 
Jackson during the early morning hours of January 15, 1996. (R. 128). The attack 
occurred on Mrs. Jackson's own property, just outside of a sliding glass door which 
leads from the Jacksons' living room to a second story deck. (R. 128). Mrs. Jackson 
mistook the Mateuses' cat for her own cat, and opened the sliding glass door. (R. 
129.) She called out the name of her cat, and extended her hand. (R. 129). The 
Mateuses' cat approached Mrs. Jackson, and she briefly petted the cat and then 
recognized that it was not hers. (R. 129). The Mateuses' cat suddenly attacked Mrs. 
4 
Jackson, inflicting severe bites and scratches to Mrs. Jackson's hand and arm. (R. 129, 
160-61). At no time did Mrs. Jackson provoke the cat. (R. 160). At no time did the 
Jacksons ever grant authorization to the Mateuses to allow the cat on the Jacksons' 
property. (R. 163-66). 
Mrs. Jackson identified the cat that attacked her as a "[y]ellow tiger tabby, 
wearing a collar, green, at least in part with a bell, well nourished, gender unknown." (R. 
161). Richard Jackson, her husband, following directions of Salt Lake County animal 
control personnel, set traps soon after the attack, and trapped a cat exactly matching the 
description given by Mrs. Jackson. (R. 161). The trapped cat was taken to animal 
control, where the Jacksons encountered Robert Mateus, the Jacksons' neighbor. (R. 161-
62.) Although the Mateuses have made some attempt to deny ownership of the cat that 
attacked and injured Mrs. Jackson, both Mrs. Jackson and her husband heard Mr. Mateus 
state that the cat that had been trapped was "clearly" his cat. (R. 161-62.) For purposes 
of their summary judgment motion, the Mateuses did not dispute ownership of the cat. (R. 
130.) 
After the Mateuses' cat attacked Mrs. Jackson, the cat was often seen in the 
Jacksons' yard. (R. 163). Mr. Jackson encountered the Mateuses' cat on his backyard 
deck near their patio door. (R. 163). He donned a pair of heavy leather gloves and 
proceeded to scratch the cat under the chin. (R. 163). The cat leaned into him apparently 
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enjoying the attention and then suddenly attacked Mr. Jackson's hand. (R. 163-64.) 
Based on the record of evidence, every time the Mateuses' cat has encountered a person, 
other than the Mateuses, an attack has occurred. (R. 160-61, 163-64). Subsequent to the 
second attack by their cat, the Mateuses continued to allow the cat to roam free, and the 
cat was routinely seen in the Jacksons' yard. (R. 165). 
The bites inflicted by the Mateuses' cat forced Mrs. Jackson to undergo surgery on 
her hand to combat the severe infection that resulted from the bites. (R. 166). Dr. 
Vanderhoof, the doctor who performed the surgery on Mrs. Jackson, stated in his 
deposition that cat bites are particularly virulent because cats have long, sharp teeth, and 
the animals' mouths are filthy and contain bacteria that causes severe infections. 
(R. 166). Dr. Vanderhoof also stated that cat bites tended to be more problematic, in 
terms of resulting serious infections, than dog bites. (R. 166). 
Prior to being attacked by the Mateuses' cat, Mrs. Jackson had a medically stable 
autoimmune disorder. (R. 165-66.) The severe and widespread infection inflicted by the 
cat bites resulted in throwing the autoimmune disorder into a state of medical instability, 
and caused her to have to undergo several surgeries. (R. 166). In 1998, Mrs. Jackson 
was forced to undergo a procedure on her esophagus that was closed up by strictures, 
which left her with a severely painful throat. (R. 167). In 1999, Mrs. Jackson was 
required to have her submandibular salivary glands removed due to their propensity to 
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become infected as a direct result of the aggravation of her autoimmune disorder. (R. 
167). The removal of the submandibular salivary glands deprived Mrs. Jackson of the 
ability to produce saliva. (R. 167). Now Mrs. Jackson is prone to oral lesions, and 
develops bone spurs in her mouth that must be removed periodically. (R. 167). 
In addition, as a result of the cat attack and resulting infection, Mrs. Jackson 
developed Frey's syndrome, which causes gustatory salivation. (R. 167). The 
condition causes the nerve endings from the parotid glands to attach to the sweat glands 
in the side of the face and resulted in the production of drenching sweat on the sides of 
Mrs. Jackson's face when she ate. (R. 167). Mrs. Jackson was forced to undergo 
surgery in which her sternocleidomastoid muscle was dissected and a portion of the 
muscle was pulled into her cheek to create a barrier between the nerve endings and the 
sweat glands to correct the condition. (R. 167). The surgery left a noticeable scar 
along Mrs. Jackson's jaw line just below her ear. (R. 167-68). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in granting the Mateuses' motion for summary judgment 
because it had evidence of negligence on the part of the Mateuses. The district court 
failed to apply the common law which requires animal owners to exercise reasonable 
control over their animals and prevent injuries to others. This rule of law was discussed 
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in the case ofPullanv. Steinmetz, 16 P.3d 1245 (Utah 2000), but not applied, as 
articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518. 
The court below also erred in failing to hold that the Mateuses were negligent for 
violating Salt Lake County Ordinances, which are safety statutes designed to prevent 
attacks by animals. The ordinances impose liability for animal owners' negligence 
regardless of the owner's knowledge of an animal's propensity to bite. A jury 
considering such statutes could have found that the Mateuses were negligent in failing to 
control their cat and prevent the attack on Mrs. Jackson. 
The Mateuses argued, and the district court agreed that a cat is entitled to one free 
bite before liability may be imposed on the owner. The one free bite rule is falling into 
disfavor in many jurisdictions as evidenced by the enactment of strict liability dog bite 
statutes. There is no logical or just reason why cat owners should be allowed to escape 
liability when dog owners are held liable for the first bite of their pets. The reasons 
articulated in PuUan by the Court for not extending liability under the dog bite statute to 
horse owners do not apply to cats. As predatory animals capable of inflicting serious and 
life changing injuries, cats should be treated in a manner similar to dogs. The Mateuses 
should be held liable for failing to control their pet and for allowing it to attack and 
severely injure Mrs. Jackson. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court that granted summary 
judgment to the defendants, and the case should be allowed to go to trial and have a jury 
decide the disputed factual issues. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MRS. JACKSON'S NEGLIGENCE 
CLAIMS AGAINST THE MATEUSES 
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DECIDED 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
a. Summary judgment is rarely the appropriate procedure for 
resolving a negligence claim. 
The trial court erred in stripping Mrs. Jackson of her right to have her negligence 
claims against the Mateuses heard before a jury. Mrs. Jackson has presented evidence 
showing that the defendants were negligent in allowing their cat to injure her. This Court 
has mled that summary judgment is rarely an appropriate remedy for resolving negligence 
actions, Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 728 (Utah 1985), and this case does not 
present the rare situation where summary judgment for the defendant was clear or 
unmistakable. 
The trial court also erred in usurping the jury's prerogative to determine whether 
the Mateuses breached the required standard of care, as that question is generally a jury 
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question, Jackson v. Dabnev. 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982), to be determined by whether the 
injury which occurred was of the type that fell within the zone of risk created by the 
defendants' negligent conduct. 'The care to be exercised in any particular case depends 
upon the circumstances of that case and on the extent of foreseeable danger involved and 
must be determined as a question of fact." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 
435 (Utah 1983); see also Eaton v. Savage, 502 P.2d 564 (Utah 1972); Wheeler v. Jones, 
431 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1967). 
b. Summary judgment was improperly granted where Mrs. Jackson 
presented a prima facie case of negligence against the Mateuses. 
A prima facie case of negligence requires a showing of: (1) a duty of reasonable 
care extending to plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and actual causation of 
the injury; and (4) damages suffered by plaintiff. Williams, 699 P.2d at 726. The court 
erred in finding that Mrs. Jackson did not present a prima facie case of negligence against 
the Mateuses. Specifically, the district court erred in holding that the Mateuses did not 
have a duty to protect Mrs. Jackson from their cat and that, absent a showing that the cat 
had attacked anyone before, the attack on Mrs. Jackson was unforeseeable. (See, R. 530). 
However, Utah law, as articulated in Pullan v. Steinmetz, 16 P.3d 1245 (Utah 
2000) and Salt Lake County's ordinances do not require a showing, in certain instances, 
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that an animal owner had prior knowledge of an animal's viciousness in order to hold 
them liable for their animal's attacks. The district court should have held the Mateuses 
liable for failing to restrain and control their cat and for failing to control their cat so as to 
prevent the attack on Mrs. Jackson. At the very least, the court should have allowed a 
jury to determine whether the Mateuses were negligent. 
For purposes of their summary judgment motion, the Mateuses conceded that their 
cat attacked and injured Mrs. Jackson. The Mateuses submitted an affidavit in which 
they professed a lack of knowledge of their cat's vicious tendencies. However, contrary 
evidence was also submitted to the district court that the Mateuses' cat inflicted a vicious, 
unprovoked attack on Mrs. Jackson. Moreover, the trial court had evidence from Richard 
Jackson that the Mateuses' cat had also attacked him and that, as an owner of cats 
himself, it was his observation that the Mateuses' cat "had a mean streak." This evidence, 
and all inferences which can be drawn from it, viewed in a light most favorable to Mrs. 
Jackson, showed that the Mateuses knew or should have known of the vicious and ill-
tempered tendencies of their cat. Based on the evidence before the trial court, summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
The district court also received evidence consisting of Salt Lake County Ordinance 
§ 8.24.010, which defines a vicious animal as one which "bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or 
otherwise attacks a human being..." Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.010(B). Under a plain 
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reading of the § 8.24.010, prior knowledge of an animal's viciousness is irrelevant for 
purposes of imposing liability for injuries inflicted by an animal. This evidence presented 
a genuine issue of material fact as to the viciousness of the cat, and should have precluded 
summary judgment. The trial court erred in ignoring such evidence and in granting 
summary judgment for the Mateuses. 
POINT II: 
DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE LIABLE 
FOR BREACHING THEIR COMMON 
LAW DUTIES TO CONTROL THEIR CAT. 
a. The common law requires that pet owners control their animals. 
The district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the Mateuses had no duty 
to control their cat. The court also erred in failing to rule that the Mateuses did not 
exercise reasonable care to keep their animal under control. Commentators, citing the 
common law, have recognized that domestic animal owners have a duty to control their 
pets: 
[u]nder the common law, as articulated in the Restatement, Torts 2d § 518, 
even if the owner or keeper of a domesticated animal does not know or have 
reason to know that the animal is abnormally dangerous, he has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to keep the animal under control. 
Cheryl M. Bailey, Annotation, Liability for Injuries Caused by Cat, 68 ALR 4th 823, 829 
(1989) (emphasis added). The Annotation also states: "[i]n some jurisdictions, statutes 
have abrogated that requirement [that owners know of their animal's viciousness], 
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imposing liability on the owner or keeper of a domesticated animal even though he did 
not know of its viciousness or mischievous propensities." Id. at 830.l In this case, at the 
very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether the defendants 
exercised reasonable care in keeping their cat under control. The district court erred by 
failing to find that the Mateuses did not exercise reasonable care to keep their animal 
under control, especially in light of the fact that the cat had no right to be on the Jackson's 
property when the attack occurred. 
b. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 states that an animal owner 
has a duty to control its animals. 
Mrs. Jackson alleged in her Complaint that: "Defendants negligently failed to 
restrain and control their cat, proximately resulting in the attack and bite, and plaintiffs 
injury and damages." (R. 1.) Under the common law, an animal owner has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to keep the animal under control. Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§518, articulates that duty and imposes a duty of reasonable care upon an animal owner 
to control its animals. Section 518 states in pertinent part: 
one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he does not know or 
have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for 
harm done by the animal, but only if: 
(b) he is negligent for failing to prevent the harm. 
1
 As will be shown below, Utah has enacted such a statute. See, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 18-1-1, etseq. 
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See also Drake v. Dean, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 331 (Cal. App. 1993) (quoting Section 518 
and stating that "[t]he common law recognizes negligence as a distinct legal theory of 
recovery for harm caused by domestic animals that are not abnormally dangerous.") 
Comment e of Section 518 states that animal owners are "under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to have them under a constant and effective control." Moreover, 
comment h of Section 518 mandates that an owner is "required to realize that even 
ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm." Whether or not the Mateuses had 
prior knowledge of their cat's viciousness, under common law, they can and should be 
held liable for injuries inflicted by their animal based on their failure to control the animal 
or their failure to take steps to prevent their animal from coming into contact, without 
their supervision, with other persons. 
c. Foreseeability under the Pullan v. Steinmetz case. 
This Court recently addressed the issue of whether to adopt Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, § 518 in Pullan v. Steinmetz. 16 P.3d 1245 (Utah 2000). The Court left for 
another day the decision whether to adopt Section 518. However, the day has come. 
This Court, in Pullen, stated that the plaintiff could not show that harm to Arielle 
Pullen was unforeseeable because the defendants had no knowledge that the plaintiff or 
other children were entering the stables and feeding the horses. Id, 2000 UT 103, ^ f 13. 
14 
On its face, the case states that the harm was unforeseeable because the contact between 
human and animal was unforeseeable.2 
In this case, the undisputed facts reveal that an entirely different situation occurred. 
The Mateuses claim the right to allow their cat to enter on the Jackson's private property. 
The Mateuses conceded that they made no effort to control their pet's activities and failed 
to prevent their cat from trespassing on others' property. (R. 133.) The Mateuses should 
have been aware that their cat would come into contact with other persons. They should 
have also known that "even ordinarily gentle animals are likely to be dangerous under 
particular circumstances" and that their cat's contact could result in an attack and harm to 
innocent persons. The reasoning set out by the Court in Pullan favors the adoption of 
Section 518 and application of that Section in this case to hold the Mateuses liable for the 
harm caused by their animal to Mrs. Jackson, because their cat's contact with others was 
foreseeable. 
Reading Pullan and Loonev v. Bingham Dairy, 260 P. 855 (1929), together, it is 
readily apparent that Utah courts have endeavored to create a balance between the right of 
animal ownership and the protection of innocent third parties from injury by those 
2
 "Simply maintaining a horse in a stable in a residential subdivision without 
any knowledge or reason to know that a child from outside the Association was 
frequenting the stables and hand feeding the horses without permission or supervision 
is an insufficient basis on which to predicate negligence on the part of the defendant." 
Pullan, 2000 UT 103 at f 13. Emphasis added. 
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animals. The court in Looney, stated that "when a domestic animal is rightly at the 
place where the injury occurs, the owner is not liable unless the viciousness of the 
animal and knowledge of such fact on the part of the owner are shown." Icf, at 857. 
Emphasis added. This quote from Looney shows how the district court erred in the 
present case: When an animal is confined and is previously unknown to be vicious, the 
animal is unlikely to be placed in a position to cause injuries to others. Moreover, if the 
animal is confined, its contact with third persons is regulated, and the chance that an 
injury will occur is decreased. However, where, as in the present case, an animal is 
allowed to stray, and its actions are unsupervised, the animal owner cannot claim that an 
animal is "rightly at the place where the injury occurs", and there is no requirement that 
the owner show that prior viciousness was not known. Where the animal is wrongfully at 
the place that an attack occurs, an animal owner should not be allowed immunity from 
liability under the rules set out in Looney and Pullan. 
In this case, the Mateuses' cat was not rightly on the Jackson's property when the 
injury occurred, and therefore, Mrs. Jackson need not show that the Mateuses have 
knowledge of their cat's viciousness in order to impose liability for the cat's attack. The 
above analysis reveals the injustice of the district court's ruling. The grant of summary 
judgment to the Mateuses relieves a pet's owners of all responsibility over and for their 
pet's actions, even where their actions have allowed the cat to come into contact with 
16 
others in the first place. Moreover, the rule places the burden of regulating pets, and of 
dealing physically, financially, and emotionally, with the injuries caused by other 
person's animals, on persons significantly less able to control the animals. The rule of 
law advocated by the Mateuses and approved by the trial court relieves the party most 
able to control an animal of all responsibility to do so, and instead places that burden on 
innocent third parties like Mrs. Jackson. If this Court is to continue utilizing tort law as a 
device for protecting society, the parties most able to prevent injuries, the Mateuses in 
this case, must be held accountable for their failure to do so. 
d. Pullan's requirement that an animal be rightly at the place 
where the injury occurred. 
Returning to Pullan, it must be noted that the Pullens conceded that they could not 
meet the test for imposing liability on either of the Defendants because the horse was 
rightly at the place where the injury occurred. However, in this case, Mrs. Jackson does 
meet the test for imposing liability on the Mateuses, because their cat was not rightfully 
on Ms. Jackson's property. The cat was an unwelcome trespasser at the time it attacked 
Mrs. Jackson. The record reveals that Mrs. Jackson momentarily mistook the Mateuses' 
cat for her own cat. Mrs. Jackson's temporary mistake of identity did not change the 
animal's unwelcome status, and the trial court erred in holding that the Mateuses' cat had 
a right to be on the Jacksons' property. 
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Utah's courts and the Utah Legislature, as well as the Salt Lake County's 
governing body, have recognized that animals have no right to trespass on other's 
property, and in certain instances have imposed liability on animal owners when they fail 
to restrain and/or prevent their animals from trespassing. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-64 (which gives boards of commissioners and city councils of cities power to 
regulate and prohibit animals from running at large, within the limits of a city); Utah 
Code Ann. § 4-25-4 (the purpose which is "to afford protection to the owners or real 
properly against animals trespassing thereon.")3 See, Nielsen v. Hyland, 170 P. 778, 780-
81 (Utah 1918)(stating that one of the purposes of the statute regarding animal trespass is 
to afford protection to the owners or real property against animals trespassing thereon.) 
From these authorities, there is a general recognition in Utah that animals have no legal 
right to be on another's property without permission from the property owner. 
This point is supported by Section 8.24.030 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances 
which states, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful for an animal owner to allow certain 
animals off their premises unless the animal is restrained: 
It is unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous or vicious animal to 
permit such animal to go off or be off the premises of the owner unless such 
3
 Mrs. Jackson concedes that Utah Code Ann. § 4-25-4 deals with large 
animals. However, this statute is indicative of a public policy against allowing an animal 
belonging to one person to enter on another's property. 
18 
animal is under restraint and properly muzzled so as to prevent it from 
injuring any person or property. . . . 
Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.030. Because the defendants' cat was vicious4, fierce 
and/or dangerous, it should not have been allowed to leave the defendants' premises 
without restraint.5 
Violation of the above ordinance is just one example of the fact that defendants' 
cat was not rightfully on the Jacksons' property when the attack occurred. Defendants 
cannot show that their cat was rightfully on the Jacksons' property at the time the cat 
viciously attacked Mrs. Jackson, and they may be held liable for their negligence, 
without requiring knowledge of viciousness of the cat, under Utah law.6 
4Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.010, which defines a vicious animal as 
one which "bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being..." Salt Lake 
County Ord. § 8.24.010(B). 
5Viewed in a light most favorable to Mrs. Jackson, the facts reveal that the 
Mateuses cat was vicious, fierce, and dangerous. 
6This analysis of absence of foreknowledge under the common law does not 
even take into account the Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 8.24.210(C), which is clear in its 
imposition of liability even where a pet owner has no foreknowledge of any propensity of 
an animal to attack or cause injury. 
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e. Animal owners are required to understand that gentle animals 
can be dangerous and are required to prevent foreseeable harm. 
The Court in Pullan continued its analysis of the plaintiffs negligence cause of 
action and addressed the standards set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 518, and 
referenced comment h of Section 518, which provides: 
one who keeps a domestic animal that possesses only those dangerous 
propensities that are normal to its class is required to know its normal habits 
and tendencies. He is required to realize that even ordinarily gentle 
animals are likely to be dangerous under particular circumstances and to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm. 
(Emphasis added). This Court found that the plaintiff in Pullan would be unable to meet 
the requirements for imposing liability because the harm was unforeseeable. 
However, comment h supports a finding that the Mateuses were negligent. A cat is 
likely to be dangerous so as to require that its owner take care to prevent foreseeable 
harm. Certainly, a cat's sharp claws and long, sharp teeth combined with its predatory 
instincts and its tendency to attack and kill prey are traits of which a cat owner are 
required to know.7 It is entirely foreseeable that when a cat is allowed to stray without 
restraint, it will come into contact with other persons and be placed in a situation where it 
could attack and bite a person. Under Section 518, comment h, the Mateuses were 
7
 "By nature, cats are predatory animals, stalking, chasing, catching, sometimes 
'toying with,' then finally killing their prey, using their claws and teeth at various stages 
throughout the ritual." Cheryl M. Bailey, Annotation, Liability for Injuries Caused by Cat, 
68 ALR 4th 823, 829(1989). 
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negligent in failing to realize that their cat, even if ordinarily gentle, could come into 
contact with and harm other persons with its sharp teeth and claws. They were negligent 
in failing to prevent their cat from coming into contact with others and for failing to 
prevent Mrs. Jackson's injuries. Contrary to the defendants' unsupported assertion below 
that cat owners cannot anticipate that their animals may attack or injure some innocent 
person, Mrs. Jackson presented evidence to the trial court in the form of Dr. Vanderhoof s 
deposition, where he testified that cat bites "are not uncommon" and that they can result 
in serious injuries. The Mateuses presented only unsupported argument that cat bites 
cannot be expected.8 
The Mateuses have also argued that cats are not inherently dangerous animals.9 
However, their argument fails to recognize the reality articulated in Comment h of the 
8Again, what defendants were really arguing was foreseeability, which was 
a question of fact which should not have been resolved on summary judgment. The issue 
of whether the cat bite was foreseeable should have been allowed to go to a jury. 
9
 Which was irrelevant to the issues before the trial court. However, it is 
significant to note that despite the fact that Utah and several other jurisdictions have dog bite 
statutes, courts have found that the dog species as a whole (excepting generally attack or 
fighting dogs) is not inherently dangerous. Lundy v. California Realty, 216 Cal. Rptr. 575 
(1985) (refusing to notice judicially that German shepherds are inherently dangerous); Sea 
Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681 (1994) (quoting Rolen v. Maryland 
Casualty Company, 240 So.2d 42, 44, (La.Ct.App. 1970) overruled on other grounds, 
Holland v. Bucklev 305 So.2d 113, 114, 117 (La. 1974) ("With regard to tort liability for 
keeping mischievous animals, most jurisdictions follow the rule that. . . animals which have 
become domesticated by man, such as horses, cows, dogs, et cetera, . . . are regarded as 
inherently safe.") 
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Restatement § 518, that any animal can be dangerous in particular situations. The 
Mateuses' complete failure to regulate and control their cat's activities, and their uncaring 
attitude for the rights of others living in close proximity to them shows a failure to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent Mrs. Jackson's severe injuries. 
The Mateuses have also argued that cats are good animals and are beneficial to 
mankind and therefore liability for their pet's attack on Mrs. Jackson should not be 
imposed on them. While persons may disagree regarding the merits of the cat species, the 
inherent qualities of cats are not at issue in this case. The defendants' negligence is the 
issue, and the trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that they should not be held 
liable for their failure to control their cat. The district court had evidence of the 
Mateuses' negligence and erred in granting summary judgment. 
POINT III 
A JURY COULD FIND THAT THE 
MATEUSES WERE NEGLIGENT DUE 
TO THEIR VIOLATIONS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY ORDINANCES. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance § 8.24.010 imposes liability on pet owners, when the 
animal attacks another person, even where an owner may not know of the animal's 
vicious propensities. Section 8.24.010 provides in pertinent part: 
Any owner or person having charge, care or custody or control of an animal 
or animals causing a nuisance, as defined below, shall be in violation of this 
title and subject to the penalties provided in this title. 
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Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.010(A). 
Subsection B of the ordinance defines an animal as a nuisance as follows, "[a]ny 
animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults, or otherwise attacks a human being or 
domestic animal on public or private property." See, Salt Lake County Ord., 
§ 8.24.010(B). 
Salt Lake County Ord. § 8.24.030 also provides that: 
It is unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous or vicious animal to 
permit such animal to go or be off the premises of the owner unless such 
animal is under restraint and properly muzzled so as to prevent it from 
injuring any person or property . . . . 
These ordinances impose liability on a pet owner when he or she fails to properly 
control and restrain a pet so as to prevent injuries and attacks. The Salt Lake County 
ordinances do not in this case, as argued by the defendants before the district court, 
impose strict liability on pet owners or require that all animals to be confined at all times. 
Rather, the ordinances are merely evidence of the Mateuses' negligence and require them 
to control their pet and take steps to prevent injuries and damages, such as Mrs. Jackson 
experienced. 
Violation of a safety standard set by statute or ordinance constitutes prima facie 
evidence of negligence.10 Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah 2000). It cannot 
1(
 Prima facie evidence is "[t]hat quantum of evidence that suffices for proof 
of a particular fact until the fact is contradicted by other evidence; once a trier of fact is faced 
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be disputed that Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.010 and § 8.24.030 are safety statutes 
designed to protect human beings against the negligence of animal owners and the danger 
of animal attacks. Furthermore, the undisputed material facts show that the Mateuses 
violated the ordinance by failing to control an animal that "bites, inflicts injury, assaults, 
or otherwise attacks a human being." See, Salt Lake Ord. § 8.04.210(C). 
The rule of law adopted by the trial court is contrary to the plain language of Salt 
Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.030, which states that a vicious animal that bites, inflicts 
injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a human being, must be kept "under restraint [while 
off the owner's premises] and properly muzzled to prevent it from injuring any person or 
property." Id Under the Salt Lake County Ordinances cited above, if a pet owner fails 
to control their pet while the animal is off their property, the owner may be held liable for 
injuries that animal inflicts. 
Mrs. Jackson provided evidence to the trial court which supported a finding that 
the Mateuses violated Salt Lake County Ordinances. Contrary to Salt Lake County 
Ordinance § 8.24.010, the Mateuses had care, custody or control over an animal that 
caused a nuisance. Contrary to Salt Lake County Ordinance § 8.24.030, the Mateuses 
with conflicting evidence, it must weigh the prima facie evidence with all of the other 
probative evidence presented." Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1999) (quoting 
Gaw v. State. 798 P.2d 1130, 1190 (Utah. App. 1990). Prima facie evidence of negligence 
is evidence which would be sufficient to submit the question of negligence to the jury and 
support a verdict of negligence. Id. 
24 
allowed a vicious or dangerous animal off their premises and allowed it to come into 
contact with and attack Mrs. Jackson. The evidence of the defendants' negligence should 
have been submitted to the jury who could have then returned a verdict of negligence. 
The trial court erred in not allowing the issues to go to the jury. 
POINT IV 
UTAH LAW DOES NOT ALLOW 
AN ANIMAL ONE FREE BITE BEFORE 
LIABILITY IS IMPOSED ON A PET OWNER. 
The "one free bite" theory advocated by the defendants is unsupported by Utah 
law. The defendants' theory is particularly unsustainable in this case where the 
Mateuses' cat was trespassing, and was not rightly on the Jackson's property at the time 
of the attack. In their summary judgment motion, the Defendants cited a 1989 ALR 
Annotation (which Mrs. Jackson also quoted and which states that a cat owner must use 
reasonable care, even without knowledge of viciousness, to control their cat), a 1987 
Georgia case (Fellers v. Carson, 356 S.E.2d 658 (Ga. App. 1987)), and a 1976 Nebraska 
case (Lee v. Weaver. 237 N.W.2d 149 (Neb. 1976)), and argued that "most" jurisdictions 
require notice to an owner of an animal's viciousness before imposing liability on the 
owner for injuries caused by the animal. 
The outdated notion advocated by the defendants and upheld by the trial court was 
shown to be falling into disfavor around the country. Mrs. Jackson provided the district 
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court with evidence that courts and legislatures around the United States are moving 
toward a more rational, principled and fair approach for imposing liability on pet owners 
when their pets cause damages to innocent persons. Utah has moved away from allowing 
one free bite by dogs, as shown by the Utah Dog Bite Statute, found in Utah Code Ann. § 
18-1-1, etseq. 
Other states have also disposed of the outdated notion that an animal is allowed a 
free bite before liability is imposed on its owner. For example, in Pennsylvania, the 
legislature has amended its "Dangerous Dog Statute," and provides that the propensity of 
an animal to attack may be proven by a single incident of infliction of severe injury or 
attack on a human being without provocation. See 3 P.S. §§ 459-502-A to 459-507-A; 3 
P.S. § 459-501-A (Repealed); Commonwealth v. Hake. 738 A.2d 46 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1999) (discussing the statute); See also Montana Code Ann. § 27-1-715; (providing that 
dog owners are strictly liable for damages caused by their dogs); Arizona Revised 
Statutes. § 11-1020 (same); Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (1990)( which reads in part: "If a dog, 
without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is acting peaceably in any place 
where the person may lawfully be, the owner of the dog is liable in damages to the person 
so attacked or injured to the full amount of the injury sustained.") Among others, these 
states have done away with the antiquated "one free bite" rule. 
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Additionally, characterizing the rule as being one that was short of strict liability, 
the court, in Hossenlopp v Cannon, 329 S.E.2d 438 (S.C. 1985), approved for use in 
South Carolina a California jury instruction based on a California statute which holds a 
dog owner liable for injuries inflicted by the animal, regardless of knowledge, or lack 
thereof, of the animal's viciousness, and regardless of negligence, providing that the 
victim does not invite attack or expose himself to attack while on the owner's property. 
Applying that standard, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a dog's owners were 
liable as a matter of law for dog bite injuries to a 4-year-old boy, notwithstanding the 
owners' claim that there was a factual issue regarding their knowledge that their dog had 
previously harmed others or had dangerous propensities. Accordingly, the court affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the injured boy on the issue of liability. 
With regard to the Georgia case of Fellers v. Carson. 356 S.E.2d 658 (Ga.App. 
1987), cited by Mateuses, that case was analyzed in the later case of Fields v. Thompson, 
378 S.E.2d 390 (Ga.App. 1989). Fields noted that Fellers predated the enactment of a 
Georgia statute § 51-2-7, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and 
who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, 
causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own 
act may be liable in damages to the person so injured. In proving vicious 
propensity, it shall be sufficient to show that the animal was required to be 
at heel or on a leash by an ordinance of a city, county, or consolidated 
government, and the said animal was at the time not at heel or on a leash. 
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The defendant in Fields, like defendants in this case, argued that he could not be 
held liable for his animal's attacks because he had no knowledge of the animal's vicious 
propensities. However, the court rejected the defendant's arguments pointing out that all 
of the cases cited by the defendant is support of his position predated the amended statute 
cited above. Therefore, that court held that the trial court erred in granting the defendant 
summary judgment and reversed the judgment. 
Fields is illustrative in showing that courts and legislatures are coming to realize 
that giving an animal one free bite is no more just that allowing a motorist one free 
accident, or a doctor one free instance of malpractice, or a criminal one free crime before 
deciding to impose liability for such actions.11 Moreover, the uone free bite" theory 
advocated by the defendants is particularly unsuited for this case where the undisputed 
facts show the defendants to be notoriously irresponsible pet owners. It is not surprising 
that defendants claim to be unaware of any other injuries inflicted by their cat. The 
evidence shows that the defendants seem to turn a blind eye to their animals' activities. 
Despite the evidence that shows that the defendants do not take steps to regulate 
their animals or even take steps to practice ordinary, safe, or prudent pet control, they 
11
 Defendants are correct in stating that, unfortunately, Nebraska continues to 
follow the old rule allowing animals one free bite. However, the Nebraska case cited by the 
defendants is inapposite to this case as Utah legislators in Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1, et seq., 
and the Salt Lake County Ordinances show an express rejection of the worn-out "one free 
bite" rule. 
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argue that they cannot be held liable unless they were aware of any prior instances of 
attacks or injuries. However, neither the common law, nor Utah statutes or the Salt Lake 
County ordinances allow persons to avoid liability by asserting ignorance of their pet's 
dangerous activities. The trial court erred in so ruling. 
POINT V: 
LIABILITY FOR INJURIES INFLICTED 
BY A CAT SHOULD BE REGARDED 
IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THOSE 
INFLICTED BY A DOG, OR ANY OTHER PET. 
a. Cat bites are common. 
Cat bites, while perhaps occurring less frequently than dog bites are nevertheless 
common and can often be much more severe and dangerous. The district court was 
presented evidence in the form of the deposition of Dr. Eric Vanderhoof, who stated in 
his deposition that cat bites are common and can be very serious: 
Q. Just curious. This is my first case I've dealt with a cat bite. 
A. They're not uncommon. Cat bites are pretty virulent. 
Human bites and cat bites are pretty bad. The problem 
with cat bites is that they have such sharp little teeth that 
when they bite, the bacteria — because their mouths are 
filthy - gets lodged inside there and has no way to get out. 
When you have a dog bite you sort of lay the thing open and 
you have a big open wound. That way the pus can't stay 
trapped and it can get out. If you're not draining pus from 
your body, oftentimes that's not a big problem. But when it 
gets trapped underneath, that's when you get into trouble. So 
cat bites tend to be more problematic than a lot of animal 
bites. 
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(R. 166.) Given the fact that cat bites are more dangerous than dog bites, in terms of 
possible infection, there is no reason why the trial court or this Court should give a cat 
owner the safe harbor of having one free bite when Utah dog owners receive no such 
escape from liability. 
b. Utah law does not allow a dog one free bite. 
The Utah Legislature has eliminated the element of foreknowledge of a dog's 
viciousness in order to hold a dog owner liable for his animal's attacks in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 18-1-1, as follows: 
Every person owning or keeping a dog shall be liable in damages for 
injury committed by such dog, and it shall not be necessary in any action 
brought therefor to allege or prove that such dog was of a vicious or 
mischievous disposition or that the owner or keeper thereof knew that 
it was vicious or mischievous; but neither the state nor any county, city, or 
town in the state nor any peace officer employed by any of them shall be 
liable in damages for injury committed by a dog when: (1) The dog has 
been trained to assist in law enforcement, and (2) the injury occurs while 
the dog is reasonably and carefully being used in the apprehension, arrest, 
or location of a suspected offender or in maintaining or controlling the 
public order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 18-1-1. Emphasis added. 
Despite a conscious decision by the Utah Legislature to impose liability on dog 
owners for their animal's attacks, without requiring a showing that the owner know of 
previous attacks, the Mateuses argue that they cannot be held liable for a cat attack under 
similar circumstances. The Mateus's argument defies logic. The Utah Legislature has 
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made an express decision to reject the antiquated "one free bite" doctrine, and there is no 
reason why that decision should not apply with equal weight to cats as well a dogs. 
Placing the burden of controlling an animal, whether cat or dog, on the pet's 
owners reflects a just and principled approach to preventing animal attacks. Imposing 
liability on pet owners also places the burden of preventing such attacks on the party most 
capable to do so. By acting responsibly, a pet owner is in the best position to control and 
restrain the animal and not allow it off of the owner's property, train the animal not to 
attack or be dangerously aggressive, and prevent it from harming others. In addition, by 
imposing liability on the Mateuses, Mrs. Jackson, an innocent party, is not required to 
bear the costs of the Mateuses' negligence. Notions of justice and fair play require that 
the Mateuses be held liable for their actions and for the actions of their cat. Therefore, the 
trial court's ruling should be reversed, and the case should be allowed to proceed to trial 
where the issues presented to the Court will be justly adjudicated. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the district court which granted 
summary judgment for the Mateuses. The facts of this case show that the Mateuses were 
negligent in allowing their cat to come into contract with Mrs. Jackson, and that they had 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to properly control their animal. The facts show that 
they breached their duty and allowed their cat to cause Mrs. Jackson's injuries. 
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Utah law does not allow an animal one free bite where the animal is an unwelcome 
trespasser on its victim's property. Because the Mateuses' cat has no legal right to be on 
Mrs. Jackson's property, there was no requirement that she show that the Mateuses have 
prior knowledge of their cat's vicious propensities. The district court erred in so ruling. 
Therefore, the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Mateuses should be 
reversed and the district court should be order to allow the case to go to trial. 
DATED this / ^ day of October, 2001. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Roger H. Bullock 
Peter H. Barlow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Judith Campbell Jackson 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDITH CAMPBELL JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MATEUS and KRIS MATEUS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS* 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS CROSS-MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990904929 
Judge Tyrone Medley 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on for hearing before the Honorable Tyrone Medley on March 5, 2001, 
at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff Judith Jackson Campbell was present. Plaintiff was represented by counsel 
Roger Bullock and Peter Barlow. Defendants Robert Mateus and Kris Mateus were represented 
by counsel Melinda A. Morgan. The Court, having reviewed the file in this matter, and having 
permitted supplemental briefing by the parties, and otherwise being fully advised, now makes and 
enters the following ruling: 





FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action arises out of a cat bite that occurred on or about January 15, 
1996, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff alleges that she was injured as a result of that cat bite because 
defendants "negligently failed to restrain and control their cat." Slee Complaint at ^ 3. 
3. Even though the defendants dispute that it was their cat that actually bit 
plaintiff, for the purposes of these motions, defendants assumed that their cat was the one that bit 
plaintiff. 
4. Plaintiff provided no evidence to show that defendants had any prior 
knowledge that their cat would cause harm to anyone, including bite or attack anyone. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A prima facie case of negligence requires plaintiff to establish a duty owed 
to her by defendants. 
2. In order to establish that duty, plaintiff has the burden to prove that it was 
foreseeable to the defendants that their cat would bite plaintiff. 
3. Plaintiff is unable to show that it was foreseeable to the defendants that 
their cat would harm anyone, including bite or attack anyone. 
4. Since plaintiff could not establish that the cat bite was foreseeable to 
defendants, plaintiff is unable to show that the defendants owed her a duty to restrain their cat. 
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5. Because plaintiff cannot establish a duty was owed to her by defendants, 
and because the establishment of this duty is necessary to prove a prima facie case of negligence 
against defendants, plaintiff is unable to prove a case of negligence against them. 
6. This Court adopts the analysis and authorities of Defendants' Memorandum 
in Support of Summary Judgment, defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and defendants' Supplemental Briefing on Defendants' Motion for 
summary Judgment, with one exception: this Court is not granting summary judgment to 
defendants on the basis of defendants' argument that the Salt Lake County Ordinances are 
unconstitutional. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. Plaintiffs Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice in its entirety, each 
party to bear its own costs. 
DATED this day of 
3 
APPROVE AS TO FORM: 
STRONG & HANN1 
ROGER H. BULLOCK 
PETER H. BARLOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument 
was hand delivered on this^cA- day of March, 2001, to the following: 
Roger H. Bullock 
Peter H. Barlow 
STRONG & HANNT 
600 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 






SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ORDINANCE § 8.04.210 
Title 8 ANIMALS 
Chapter 8.04 DEFINITIONS 
8.04.210 Vicious animal. 
"Vicious animal" means: 
A. Any animal which, in a vicious and terrorizing manner approaches any person in apparent 
attitude of attack upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds or places; 
B. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency or disposition to attach or to cause injury or 
otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or animals; or 
C. Any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a human being or 




SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ORDINANCE § 8.24.010 
Title 8 ANIMALS 
Chapter 8 24 ANIMAL BITES AND NUISANCES 
8.24.010 Nuisance acts designated-Penalties. 
A. Any owner or person having charge, care, custody or control of an animal or animals causing 
a nuisance, as defined below, shall be in violation of this title and subject to the penalties 
provided in this title. 
B. The following shall be deemed a nuisance: 
1. Any animal which: 
a. Causes damages to the property of anyone other than its owner, 
b. Is a vicious animal as defined in this title and kept contrary to Section 8.24.030 below, 
c. Causes unreasonable fouling of the air by odors, 
d. Causes unsanitary conditions in enclosures or surroundings, 
e. Defecates on any public sidewalk, park or building, or on any private property without the 
consent of the owner of such private property, unless the person owning, having a proprietary 
interest in, harboring or having care, charge, control, custody or possession of such animal 
shall remove any such defecation to a proper trash receptacle, 
f. Barks, whines or howls, or makes other disturbing noises in an excessive, continuous or 
untimely fashion, 
g. Molests passersby or chases passing vehicles, 
h. Attacks other domestic animals, 
i. Otherwise acts so as to constitute a nuisance or public nuisance under the provisions of 
Chapter 10, Title 76, Utah Code Annotated (1953); 
2. Any animals which, by virtue of the number maintained, are offensive or dangerous to the 
public health, welfare or safety. (Prior code § 100-1-16) 
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ADDENDUM D: 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ORDINANCE § 8.04.030 
Title 8 ANIMALS 
Chapter 8.24 ANIMAL BITES AND NUISANCES 
8.24.030 Fierce, dangerous or vicious animals. 
It is unlawful for the owner of any fierce, dangerous or vicious animal to permit such animal to 
go or be off the premises of the owner unless such animal is under restraint and properly 
muzzled so as to prevent it from injuring any person or property. Every animal so vicious and 
dangerous that it cannot be controlled by reasonable restraints, and every dangerous and 
vicious animal not effectively controlled by its owner or person having charge, care or control of 
such animal, so that it shall not injure any person or property, is a hazard to public safety, and 
the director of animal services shall seek a court order pursuant to Section 8.40.010 for 
destruction of or muzzling of the animal. (Prior code § 100-1-15) 
http://ordlink.com/codes/saltlkco/ DATA/TITLE08/C.../8__24^030__Fierce_dangerous
-
or_.htm 9/6/00 /a 
